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United States v. Mitchell: The Fifth
Amendment at Sentencing

Whether the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
may be claimed by a criminal defendant after conviction is an open
question. In United States v. Mitchell,' the Third Circuit aligned itself
with the minority of circuits by holding that defendants retain no Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination with respect to the facts or
circumstances of a crime once convicted, even though their testimony
may work to increase their level of punishment.'
I. BACKGROUND
In Mitchell, defendant was indicted on four counts for her involvement
in a four-year cocaine conspiracy extending from 1989 to 1994. Count
one charged Mitchell with conspiring to distribute five or more kilograms
of cocaine, which carries a minimum mandatory ten year sentence.
Mitchell entered an open plea of guilty to all counts, but specifically
reserved her right to contest the amount of codaine she had distributed.
The trial court explained to Mitchell that by entering a plea of guilty she
was waiving her Fifth Amendment right not to testify.3
The case against nine of Mitchell's co-defendants went to trial a few
months later. During the trial, some of Mitchell's co-defendants, who
pled guilty and agreed to cooperate with the Government, testified about
the extent of Mitchell's involvement in the conspiracy. Richard
Thompson, a co-defendant, testified that Mitchell sold one and a half
ounces of cocaine two to three times a week between April 1992 and
December 1993. Later, at Mitchell's sentencing hearing, Thompson
adopted his trial testimony and elaborated on the specific amount of
cocaine Mitchell had sold. Thompson testified that Mitchell had received
one and a half ounces of cocaine two to three times a week beginning in
April 1992; that she received the same amount three to five times a
week between August 1992 and December 1993; and that Mitchell was

1. 122 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 1997).
2. Id. at 191.
3. Id. at 186-87.
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in charge of distribution from January 1994 through March 1994. On
cross examination, Thompson conceded that he had not consistently seen
Mitchell during these times.4
Another witness for the Government, Alvita Mack, testified that he
had bought a total of two ounces of cocaine from Mitchell on three
occasions under the supervision of the DEA. This testimony was also
adopted by both parties during the sentencing hearing. Mitchell
contended at the sentencing hearing that this was the only quantity of
cocaine established by reliable testimony and thus the only amount for
which she should be held responsible. Mitchell did not testify at the
sentencing hearing nor did she offer any evidence to contravene that of
the Government."
The district judge then indicated that he believed Mitchell retained no
Fifth Amendment right to remain silent at the sentencing hearing with
respect to the crimes to which Mitchell had pled guilty. On this premise,
the district court judge told Mitchell, "I held it against you that you
didn't come forward today and tell me that you really only did this a
couple of times [and] I'm taking the position that you should come
The trial judge then
forward and explain your side of this issue.
concluded that Mitchell had sold a total of thirteen kilograms of cocaine
from 1992-1994. Mitchell was sentenced to ten years imprisonment, six
years of supervised release, and a special assessment of two hundred
dollars.7
Mitchell appealed the conviction, arguing that the district court had
violated her Fifth Amendment right not to testify at the sentencing
hearing!8 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the
decision of the district court and held that when a criminal defendant
has pled guilty to or has been convicted of a crime, that defendant
retains no Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination with
respect to the facts or circumstances of that crime even though the
testimony may affect the level of punishment.9
II.

LEGAL HISTORY

The Fifth Amendment provides in part that "no person shall ... be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."0 This

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id.
Id. at 187-88.
Id. at 188.
Id.
Id.

9. Id. at 191-92.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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right extends to defendants in all proceedings where their statements
may be used to incriminate them.1' However, the right is not absolute
and ceases to apply once the sanctions that justify the invocation of the
privilege are removed. 2 "The interdiction of the [Fifth] Amendment
operates only where a witness is asked to incriminate himself,--in other
words, to give testimony which may possibly expose him to a criminal
charge." 13 Thus, the Fifth Amendment's sole concern is preventing
witnesses from being forced to give testimony that may lead to the
infliction of criminal penalties. 4
In the past, the Court's holdings sufficed to offer protection to criminal
defendants who had pled guilty to or been convicted of a crime.
However, with mandatory minimum sentences and the institution of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("the Guidelines")," which mandate
certain sentence increases or reductions, the contours of the Fifth
Amendment protection have become somewhat obscured. The Guidelines
condition the sentence not merely upon the core facts that constitute the
crime but on "specific offense characteristics."' For example, in drug
related offenses the base offense (the acts constituting the crime) may be
conspiring to distribute cocaine. The specific offense characteristics
would be the amount of cocaine for which the defendant is responsible. 7 These specific offense characteristics are aggravating factors.'
If indeed the concern of the Fifth Amendment is with the "penalties
affixed to the criminal acts," 9 then this concern may be frustrated
when defendants' testimony works to enlarge their sentences, sometimes
nearly twofold.
Defendants have often been asked to testify at their own sentencing
hearings regarding a crime to which they have either already pled guilty
or for which conviction is had, and frequently defendants assert their
Fifth Amendment privilege. The circuit courts stand uniformly on the
proposition that if a defendant remains subject to the possibility of
prosecution, the defendant may not be compelled to testify and can
properly assert his Fifth Amendment privilege.2" However, the circuits
are split when the issue of further prosecution is removed and the

11.
12.
13.
14.

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967).
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 431 (1956).
Id.
Id at 438-39 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886)).

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL [hereinafter U.S.S.G.].
Id. at § 181.3.
Id.
Id.
Ullmann, 350 U.S. at 438-39.
See Mitchell, 122 F.3d at 190.
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defendant is asked to talk only about the crime for which the defendant
has already been convicted.2 1
The Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the issue raised in
Mitchell, namely whether defendants retain their Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination for crimes when they no longer face
the possibility of conviction, nor risk additional prosecutions, but when
such testimony may lengthen the sentence. The circuit courts have
found language in several of the Supreme Court cases upon which they
have based their decisions when resolving this issue. Two approaches
have emerged in the circuits and, not surprisingly, the two are directly
opposed.' The approach followed by the Second and Third Circuits is
that when defendants plead guilty to a crime, they admit commission of
that crime and waive their privilege as to the acts comprising the
crime." In support of this approach, these circuits point to instances
where the Supreme Court has written "if the criminality has already
been taken away, the [Ajmendment ceases to apply."24
Although the Third Circuit labeled the issue in Mitchell as one of first
impression, the court had already touched upon the issue earlier in
United States v. Frierson.25 The Frierson decision accurately reflects
the position of the circuits that follow the "waiver-by-plea" doctrine.2"
The court in Friersonsaid, "the... privilege is not implicated when a
defendant is asked to talk about the crime to which he has pled guilty
and about his or her attitude concerning that crime. Nor is [it]
implicated if the sentence imposed is more harsh because of the
defendant's [testimony].'
The circuits taking the other approach do so with little discussion,
holding that "the convicted but unsentenced defendant retains a
legitimate protectable Fifth Amendment interest as to matters that could

21. See United States v. Rodriguez, 706 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment ceases to apply upon conviction). For cases to the contrary, holding that the
convicted defendant retains the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, see
United States v. Kuku, 129 F.3d 1435 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Garcia, 78 F.3d
1457 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Lugg, 892 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
22. See supra note 21 and cases cited therein.
23. United States v. Frierson, 945 F.2d 650, 656 (3d Cir. 1991). While a decision on
this issue was not necessary in Frierson,the court accurately recited the state of the law
in the circuits following this rationale.
24. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 67 (1906).
25. 945 F.2d 650 (3d Cir. 1991).
26. Id. at 657. The waiver-by-plea doctrine is the name given to the situation where
a defendant has pled guilty and the Fifth Amendment is held waived with respect to the
acts constituting that crime.
27. h1. at 657 n.2.
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A typical example of this approach is found in

the Tenth Circuit's decision in United States v. Garcia." Defendant in

Garcia had entered into a plea agreement whereby one count for
conspiracy to distribute cocaine was dropped in exchange for defendant's
guilty plea to one count of distribution. However, the agreement
expressly left sentencing to the discretion of the trial judge and the
mandates of the Guidelines. The judge at the sentencing hearing in
Garcia indicated that defendant had waived his Fifth Amendment right
by entering a guilty plea. The trial judge then considered defendant's
silence and refusal to take the witness stand to refute evidence
pertaining to the amount attributable to defendant in fixing the amount
of cocaine chargeable to defendant.30 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held
that the trial judge had erred with respect to the Fifth Amendment
rights of defendant at the sentencing phase of the trial.3 " The court
wrote, "[tihe availability of the privilege does not turn upon the type of
proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the
statement or admission and the exposure it invites." 2 The court noted
that defendant faced "exposure" because his testimony admitting to
distribution of a certain amount of cocaine could have enhanced the
sentence he faced.' Thus, in those circuits that follow the Garcia
approach, "[tihere is no question but that the Fifth Amendment does
offer protection in the sentencing process... and the defendant does not
lose [that privilege] by reason of his conviction of a crime."'
III. THIRD CIRcuIT's RATIONALE

In Mitchell, the court explained that the Fifth Amendment extends to
defendants the right not to provide evidence by their own testimony that
may be used against them in a criminal prosecution or that may be used
to instigate a criminal prosecution against them. 5 The court wrote
that the exercise of this right may not be used in any way to penalize a
defendant,36 and neither may comment be made on the defendant's
invocation of the privilege; 7 but when a defendant has been convicted,

28. United States v. De La Cruz, 996 F.2d 1307, 1312 (1st Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
29. 78 F.3d 1457, 1463 (10th Cir. 1996).

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id at 1460-63.
Id at 1463.
Id. (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967)).
Id. at 1463 n.8.
Id. at 1463 (citations omitted).

35. 122 F.3d at 189 (citing Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)).
36. Id. (citing Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 434 (1984)).
37. Id. (citing Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 62 (1893)).
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"the privilege is lost because 'he can no longer be incriminated by his
testimony [concerning that] crime."'38 Relying on the earlier decision
in Frierson,the court noted that upon a defendant's plea of guilty to a
crime, the defendant waives the privilege regarding the acts constituting
that crime.39
The court responded to cases cited by Mitchell on appeal and
distinguished those from Mitchell's case. 40 The court rejected two cases
cited by Mitchell and stated the issue in those cases was the district
courts' attempt to compel the defendants to testify to acts beyond those
of the actual crime for which they had been convicted. 41 The court
distinguished these by finding that invocation of the Fifth Amendment
privilege in those cases was to avoid inculpation in crimes additional to
those for which the defendants were being sentenced and for which guilt
had not been established.42 In other words, criminal defendants retain
their Fifth Amendment rights with respect to acts beyond those which
pertain to the crime of conviction. Thus, the court wrote "a defendant's
plea of guilty to one offense does not 'by its own force ... waive [the
Fifth Amendment] privilege with respect to other alleged transgressions."' The court distinguished the third case, Frierson, and explained that the case held that when a defendant fails to claim his Fifth
Amendment privilege but refuses to testify, that refusal may be held
against the defendant in denying the defendant a sentence reduction."
After summarizing and dismissing the cases cited by Mitchell, the court
stated that the cases were simply examples of the general principle that
defendants retain their Fifth Amendment right regarding offenses for
which they have not yet been convicted.45
Therefore, noting that the issue presented was one of first impression,
the court demonstrated the novelty of Mitchell's claim.' The court
distinguished this case from those cases when a criminal defendant was
asked to testify but was able to rightfully invoke his Fifth Amendment
privilege and avoid testifying to acts that would have placed the

38. Id. (quoting Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507, 513 (1960)).
39. Id. (quoting Frierson,945 F.2d at 656).
40. Id. (citing Fierson, 945 F.2d 650; United States v. Huebel, 864 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir.

1989); and United States v. Garcia, 544 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1976)).
41. Id. (citing Huebel, 864 F.2d 1104 and Garcia, 544 F.2d 681).

42. Id.
43. Id. at 190 (quoting United States v. Yurasovich, 580 F.2d 1212, 1218 (3d Cir.

1978)).
44. Id. at 190-91. The court in reaching its conclusion relied heavily on dicta in
Fierson. This is discussed infra in the text of this Note.
45. Id. at 190.
46. Id.
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defendant at risk of prosecution for additional crimes.' The court
pointed to the oft repeated language in those cases that "Fifth Amendment self-incrimination rights continue in force until sentencing."
However, the court indicated that this was not the rule of law.49 The
court explained that this language had emerged from cases where nonpleading defendants had sought to compel testimony from a defendant
who had already pled guilty to a crime but had not yet been sentenced." Because defendants awaiting sentencing could by testimony
implicate themselves in further crimes, the language in those cases was
not intended as a rule, but rather went to the procedural status of the
case.51 The court indicated that the language, which seemingly
supported Mitchell, was mere dicta and that it did not extend the Fifth
Amendment privilege to sentencing proceedings. 2
Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that some of the circuits had
adopted the rule that defendants may invoke the Fifth Amendment
privilege when their testimony may enhance the sentence." The court
rejected the rationale employed in those cases and cited a footnote in
Frierson: "the Fifth Amendment... is not implicated when a defendant
is asked to talk about the crime to which he has pled guilty [even
though] the sentence imposed is more harsh because of the defendant's
response to that interrogation."5
The court iterated that it was unable to find either within the
Amendment itself or in the Supreme Court cases "any basis for holding
that the self-incrimination that is precluded extends to testimony that
would have an impact on the appropriate sentence for the crime of
conviction." 5 The court then cited a 1961 hornbook 56 and found that
to extend the privilege to acts constituting the crime of conviction "would
contravene the established principle that upon conviction, 'criminality
ceases; and with criminality the privilege.' 5 7 The court declared that
although there may be "many components to be considered when

47.

Id.

48. Id. (quoting Bank One of Cleveland, N.A. v. Abbe, 916 F.2d 1067, 1076 (6th Cir.
1990)).
49. Id. at 191.

50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 190.
53. Id (citing Garcia,78 F.3d at 1463).
54. Id. (quoting Frierson,945 F.2d at 656 n.2).
55. 122 F.3d at 191.
56. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIAL AT COMMON LAW § 2279 (John T.
McNaughton ed., 1961).
57. 122 F.3d at 191.
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computing the sentence in the new era of Sentencing Guidelines... one
cannot logically fragment the sentencing process for this purpose and
Mitchell argued
retain the privilege against self-incrimination.'
further that while she had pled guilty to the conspiracy to distribute
cocaine, she had not pled to any specific amount of cocaine, and therefore
had not admitted to the crime for which she was being sentenced (which
was distributing five or more kilos of cocaine.)5" The court rejected this
argument stating that "Mitchell opened herself up to the full range of
possible sentences for distributing cocaine when she was told... that
the penalty for conspiring to distribute cocaine had a maximum
[sentence] of life imprisonment."60
Because the testimony that the court sought from Mitchell was not
testimony that would have opened Mitchell up to further criminal
prosecution for additional crimes and because Mitchell did not run the
risk of being retried for the same offense, the court found that Mitchell's
refusal to testify was properly held against her."' The court reasoned
that the amount of cocaine that Mitchell was responsible for was "not an
issue of independent criminality" and therefore, Mitchell had lost her
Fifth Amendment privilege with regard to the crime of conviction. 2
Moreover, while Mitchell may have "put the [G]overnment to its proof
as to the amount of drugs, her declination to testify on that issue could
Thus, although Mitchell faced the
properly be held against her.'
possibility of a harsher sentence, the Fifth Amendment privilege was no
longer available to her."
Judge Michel concurred only in the judgment and indicated that the
case should have been disposed of under the Harmless Error rule
because there was sufficient evidence in the record from which the trial
judge could have determined Mitchell's sentence.6 5 Judge Michel
expressed his concern as to the majority's "categorical rationale that a
guilty plea entirely waives a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege-even as to facts that are not elements of the offense charged and
He
as to which a defendant expressly 'reserved' in offering a plea.'
was not prepared to rule that a guilty plea to the crime of conviction
waived the Fifth Amendment privilege "in the face of such an express

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
1&
Id.
Id. at 192 (Michel, J., concurring).
Id.
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reservation as to a non-element [of the crime of conviction], especially
where, as here, the defendant's silence" worked to double the sentence.67 The concurrence closed by noting that the majority had created
"an apparent split among [the] [clircuits," and that a ruling on an issue
of this importance should have been reserved for a case when deciding
it was unavoidable."
IV IMPLICATIONS
The Third Circuit's decision aligns itself with a minority of the circuit
courts on this issue by holding that the convicted defendant does not
retain a Fifth Amendment right with respect to the crime of conviction.
Stated another way, upon conviction the sentencing court may properly
compel the defendant to testify to acts which relate to the crime of
conviction provided that the testimony will not subject her to further
criminal prosecution.69 Consider below some arguments which militate
against the approach adopted in Mitchell.
The problem that the holding in Mitchell presents is really a function
of the Guidelines, which prescribe sentence lengths for particular crimes.
Because these guidelines "step-up" or enhance a defendant's sentence for
aggravating factors, a defendant such as Mitchell is faced with a difficult
choice. Although there may be advantages to pleading guilty, such as
avoiding the cost of a trial the defendant may be certain to lose, the
defendant must proceed to sentencing faced with a "cruel trilemma." 0
This "cruel trilemma" is that the defendant may either remain silent and
be held in contempt, testify untruthfully risking perjury, or testify
truthfully giving testimony that the defendant knows will subject him
to a more severe penalty.7 An oft made argument in support of the
Fifth Amendments protection is that it contravenes the moral nature of
man to incriminate himself." This argument is usually offered for the
privilege in the first instance (prior to conviction), but it would seem that
the argument applies with even greater force to a defendant who has
been convicted and awaits his sentence, who if then compelled to testify
becomes the "deluded instrument of his own execution." 3

67. Id.
68. Id. "Given the unsettled state of the law among the [clircuits on this important
Fifth Amendment issue, I would defer a decision on it to a case in which deciding it is
unavoidable .... " Id.

69. Id. at 191.
70. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 299 (1981).
71. Id.
72. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973).
73. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462 (1981) (citations omitted).
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Further, the Supreme Court has written "it [is] better for an occasional crime to go unpunished than the prosecution should be free to build
up a criminal case, in whole or in part, with the assistance of enforced
disclosures by the accused."74 Likewise, although the privilege may
occasionally "save a guilty man from his just deserts" it tempers their
"tendency in human nature to abuse power" and the prosecution is
forced to play by the rules.7" It seems that removing the privilege from
the defendant at sentencing makes great the potential for abuse by
prosecutors and judges with little benefit to the administration ofjustice.
The burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the quantity
of cocaine attributable to a defendant remains on the Government at the
sentencing phase. 7' By removing the defendant's Fifth Amendment
privilege, the prosecution is not "put to its proof" as the majority in
Mitchell wrote,77 but rather is relieved of its proof as the defendant
may now be compelled to divulge all facts concerning the crime of
conviction.
Moreover, if "the sole concern is... with [the] penalties affixed to the
criminal acts,"78 it is as much the punishment that is attached to the
conviction, as the conviction itself, that the Fifth Amendment seeks to
provide defendants. 79 Thus, while the label of conviction may carry
with it a moral stigma, the prospective penalty of imprisonment
redoubles the imposition of the label, and to the stigma adds a loss of
freedom. The Fifth Amendment privilege would be rarely invoked if no
sanction accompanied conviction.
Finally, it seems that the decision in Mitchell provides the opportunity
for the prosecution and the sentencing court to avoid its statutorily
imposed task in determining the sentence of a convicted defendant. If
a defendant upon conviction refuses to testify to his involvement in
whatever crime he is convicted of, the sentencing court may then hold
the defendant in contempt of court and thereby imprison the defendant
for contempt. This then subjects the defendant to a further penalty
irrespective of the crime for which she is convicted.
In sum, the unsettled state of the Fifth Amendment privilege at
sentencing presents some serious questions in light of the Guidelines.
In the Third Circuit a criminal defendant will now be compelled to
testify concerning all acts and relevant conduct surrounding the crime

74. Ullmann, 350 U.S. at 427.
75, Id. at 428.
76. Id.

77. 122 F.3d at 191.
78. Ullmann, 350 U.S. at 438-39 (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 634) (emphasis added).
79. Id.
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for which he is convicted or has pled guilty even when such testimony
may negatively affect his sentence. In other circuits such as the Tenth,
a defendant will retain his Fifth Amendment rights through sentencing.
It appears the circuits will remain definitely split on the issue until the
issue is ultimately decided by the Supreme Court.
MATTHEw E. COOK

